Security of linear ramp secret sharing schemes can be characterized by the relative generalized Hamming weights of the involved codes [26, 24] . In this paper we elaborate on the implication of these parameters and we devise a method to estimate their value for general one-point algebraic geometric codes. As it is demonstrated, for Hermitian codes our bound is often tight. Furthermore, for these codes the relative generalized Hamming weights are often much larger than the corresponding generalized Hamming weights.
Introduction
A linear ramp secret sharing scheme [4, 41] can be described as a coset construction C 1 /C 2 where C 2 C 1 are linear codes [5] . It was shown in [2, 24, 36] that the corresponding relative dimension/length profile (RDLP) expresses the worst case information leakage to unauthorized sets in such a system. RDLP was proposed by Luo et al. [26] . They [26] also proposed the relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) and its equivalence to RDLP, similar to the one demonstrated by Forney [11] between the dimension/length profile and the generalized Hamming weight. The m-th RGHW expresses the smallest size of unauthorized sets that can obtain m q-bits [2, 24] , where q is the size of the alphabet of C 2 C 1 . In order to investigate the potential and the possibility of linear codes to construct useful ramp secret sharing schemes, it is indispensable to study the RGHW and the RDLP. However, not much research has been done so far, partly because the connection between the secret sharing and RGHW/RDLP was recently reported. In particular, few classes of linear codes have been examined for their RGHW/RDLP. In this paper we study RGHW of general linear codes by the Feng-Rao approach [14] , and explore its consequences on one-point algebraic geometry (AG) codes [38, 19] and in particular the Hermitian codes [37, 35, 42] .
The present paper starts with a discussion of known results regarding linear ramp secret sharing schemes and it continues with demonstrating that the RGHWs can also be used to express the best case information leakage. The main result of the paper is a method to estimate RGHW of one-point algebraic geometric codes. This is done by carefully applying the Feng-Rao bounds [14] for primary [1] as well as dual [9, 10, 33, 19, 28, 18] codes. From this we derive a relatively simple bound which uses information on the corresponding Weierstrass semigroup [20, 6] . As shall be demonstrated for Hermitian codes the new bound is often sharp. Moreover for the same codes the RGHW are often much larger than the corresponding generalized Hamming weights (GHW) [39] , which means that studies of RGHW cannot be substituted by those of GHW.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the use of RGHW in connection with linear ramp secret sharing schemes and in connection with communication over the wiretap channel of type II. In Section 3 we apply the theory to the special case of MDS codes. In Section 4 we show -at the level of general linear codes -how to employ the Feng-Rao bounds to estimate RGHW. This method is then applied to one-point algebraic geometric codes in Section 5. We investigate Hermitian codes in Section 6 and treat the corresponding ramp secret sharing schemes in Section 7.
2 Ramp secret sharing schemes and wiretap channels of type II Ramp secret sharing schemes were introduced in [4, 41] . Let F q be the finite field with q elements. A ramp secret sharing scheme with t-privacy and rreconstruction is an algorithm that given an input s ∈ F ℓ q , outputs a vector x ∈ F n q , the vector of shares that we want to share among n players, such that given a collection of shares {x i | i ∈ I}, where I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, one has no information about s if #I ≤ t and one can recover s if #I ≥ r [5] . We shall always assume that t is largest possible and that r is smallest possible such that the above hold. We say that one has a t-threshold secret sharing scheme if t = r + 1.
We consider the secret sharing schemes introduced in [5, Section 4.2] , this was the first construction of ramp secret sharing schemes using linear codes: Let C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n q be two linear codes. Set k 2 = dim(C 2 ) and k 1 = dim(C 1 ) and let L F n q be such that C 1 = L ⊕ C 2 (direct sum). We denote by ℓ = dim(L) = dim(C 1 /C 2 ) = k 1 − k 2 .
We consider a secret s ∈ F ℓ q , note that ℓ > 0 since C 1 = C 2 . We fix a vector space isomorphism ψ : F ℓ q → L, which maps the secret s ∈ F ℓ q to L and choose c 2 ∈ C 2 randomly (uniformly distributed). Finally, consider x = ψ( s) + c 2 ∈ C 1 . The n shares consist of the n coordinates of x, this scheme is clearly F q -linear [5] . One may also consider that the secret s is represented by the coset ψ( s) + C 2 in C 1 /C 2 . Note that there are q ℓ different cosets in C 1 /C 2 and there are q k 2 possible representatives for every coset, i.e. for generating the shares of a secret s. The schemes in [7, 27] are a particular case of this scheme with ℓ = 1. Remark 1. All linear ramp secret sharing schemes with shares in F q are of the above type. For constructions that use puncturing [27] , [5, Sec. 4 .1] we can take C 1 , C 2 to be the punctured codes.
Let I ⊆ J = {1, . . . , n}, we consider that an unauthorized set of participants obtains the shares {x i | i ∈ I}. We represent the shares by a random variable X and the shares obtained by an unauthorized set of participants by f I ( x) = (x i | i ∈ I), where f I : F n q → F #I q . The amount of information in q-bits that the unauthorized set obtains is measured by I( S; f I ( X)), the mutual information, where S is the random variable that represents the secrets and f I ( X) is the random variable that represents the shares that an unauthorized set may obtain. We assume that both S and X are uniformly distributed. In particular we have t-privacy and r-reconstruction, if t is largest possible and r is smallest possible such that I( S; f I ( X)) = 0 for all #I ≤ t and I( S; f I ( X)) = ℓ for all #I ≥ r. A (non sharp) bound for r and t was given in [5] : r > n − d(C 1 ) and t < d(C 
where I = J \ I and
For the convenience of the reader, we include the computation of the previous mutual information: since the variables S and X are uniformly distributed, one has that
Here, H q is the entropy function to base q. Therefore,
and we obtain equation (1) . Equation (2), follows from (1) and an extension of Forney's second duality lemma [23, Lemma 25] 
In order to characterize the security of secret sharing schemes, one considers the jth relative dimension/length profile (RDLP) of two codes C 2 C 1 , with j ∈ {1, . . . , n} [26] :
and the mth relative generalized Hamming weight (RGHW), with m ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} [26] :
In this way, the worst amount of information leakage of s from j shares is precisely characterized by the jth relative dimension/length profile of C 
The smallest possible number of shares for which an unauthorized set of participants can determine m q-bits of information is Theorem 9] . (See also [2, Th. 6.7] and for the special case of ℓ = 1 [7, Cor. 1.7] ). We now generalize the notion of t-privacy and r-construction.
Definition 2. We say that a ramp secret sharing scheme has (t 1 , . . . , t ℓ )-privacy and (r 1 , . . . , r ℓ )-reconstruction if t 1 , . . . , t ℓ are chosen largest possible and r 1 , . . . , r ℓ are chosen smallest possible such that:
• an adversary cannot obtain m q-bits of information about s with any t m shares,
• it is possible to recover m q-bits of information about s with any collection of r m shares.
In particular, one has t = t 1 and r = r ℓ .
By our previous discussion, one has that 
This value is closely related to r m , since any strictly larger set of shares will determine m q-bits of information about s, thus
In particular one has that r = r ℓ = n − M 1 (C 1 , C 2 ) + 1 [24, Theorem 9] (see also [7, Cor. 1.7] for the special case ℓ = 1). We note that r ′ m corresponds to the (m − 1)th conjugate relative length/dimension profile in [43] .
Theorem 3. Let C 1 /C 2 where dim C 1 − dim C 2 = ℓ be a linear ramp secret sharing scheme with (t 1 , . . . , t ℓ )-privacy and (r 1 , . . . , r ℓ )-construction.
We shall relate the above concept of (t 1 , . . . , t ℓ )-privacy and (r 1 , . . . , r ℓ )-construction with the literature: let D 1 D 2 ⊆ F n q be vector spaces of codimension ℓ and define for 1 ≤ m ≤ ℓ,
is the collection of shares that give m q-bits of information about S. In addition, A ℓ (D 1 , D 2 ) is the access structure in the sense of [21] and
In particular we are interested in the largest and smallest element of such collection of shares
and, we are interested in its size, therefore we define
Moreover, we are interested in the smallest and the largest size of a collection of shares that reveal m q-bits of information: the first one being the
Analogously, the largest size of a collection of shares that reveals m q-bits of information is the largest d ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
is non-empty and it is equal to n − M ℓ−m+1 (C 1 , C 2 ) + 1 = r m . Ramp secret sharing schemes with ℓ > 1 are relevant in the situation where the set of possible secrets is large, but one wants to keep the size of each share small. A further motivation for considering ℓ > 1 comes from the analogy to the wiretap channels of type II [40, 32] . Recall that this model involves a main channel from Alice to Bob which is assumed to be error and erasure free and a secondary channel from Alice to the eavesdropper Eve which is a q-ary erasure channel. Consider the slightly more general situation that also the main channel is a q-ary erasure channel [36] . Assuming that the probability of erasure is much smaller on the main channel than on the secondary channel we see that to achieve reliable and secure communication we should use long codes C 2 C 1 . To retain a positive information rate on the main channel we therefore need ℓ > 1. The exact values of the mutual information on the primary and the secondary channel could be calculated from
. . , ℓ and the erasure probabilities of the two channels; but it seems a difficult task to determine
would be a first step in this direction. As we shall see in the following, for many codes we can easily estimate these last mentioned parameters.
In the remaining part of this paper we shall concentrate on methods to estimate RGHW. We shall need the following definition which by [25] is equivalent to (3) (see also [2, Def. 6.2]).
the mth relative generalized Hamming weight is defined as
From this definition the connection between the RGHW and the generalized Hamming weight (GHW) becomes clear -the last being d m (C 1 ) = M m (C 1 , C 2 ) with C 2 = { 0}. Before embarking with more general classes of codes we discuss in the next section the parameters t m , r m in the case of MDS codes.
Ramp schemes based on MDS codes
Let C be an MDS code of dimension k. Then C ⊥ is also MDS and consequently
which is to say that all generalized Hamming weights attain the Singleton bound. Consider two MDS codes C 2 C 1 with dim
But the Singleton bound for RGHW is identical to the Singleton bound for GHW [26,
. Based on (6) and (7) one can show that
and from Theorem 3 it now follows that if we base a ramp scheme on two MDS codes then the size of a group uniquely determines how much information it can reveal
When the number of participants is large compared to the field size then by the MDS conjecture we cannot assume C 1 and C 2 to be MDS and consequently we can no longer assume (8) . What is obviously needed is a method to estimate the left and the right side of (8) for codes of any length. As shall be demonstrated in the following the Feng-Rao method gives a way to achieve this.
The Feng-Rao bounds for RGHW
The Feng-Rao bounds come in two versions: One for primary codes [1, 15, 14] and one for dual codes [8, 9, 10, 33, 19, 28] . The most general formulations deal with arbitrary linear codes, whereas more specialized formulationssuch as the order bounds -require that the code construction is supported by certain types of algebraic structures. The bounds have been applied to the minimum distance, the generalized Hamming weights -and for the case of dual codes of co-dimension 1 -also the relative minimum distance [7] . It is not difficult to extend the method for estimating GHW to a method for estimating RGHW. In the following we give the details for primary codes in the language of general linear codes. The details for dual codes are similar, hence for these codes we shall give a more brief description.
We start by introducing some terminology that shall be used throughout the section. Let B = { b 1 , . . . , b n } be a fixed basis for F n q as a vector space over F q and write J = {1, . . . , n}. Here, we used the convention that Span ∅ = { 0}. Finally,ρ( 0) = 0.
The component wise product of two vectors in F n q plays a fundamental role in our exposition. This product is given by
Definition 6. An ordered pair (i, j) ∈ J × J is said to be one-way well-
As is easily seen -if D ⊆ F n q is a vector space of dimension m then it holds that #ρ D\{ 0} = m. (Actually, any set
The following result is a slight modification of material in [1] .
Proof. Let l 1 < · · · < l σ be the elements in ∪ i∈ρ(D\{ 0}) Λ i and let i 1 , . . . , i σ and j 1 , . . . , j σ be such that for s = 1, . . . , σ it holds that:
• i s ∈ρ(D\{ 0}),
The proposition now follows from the fact that the dimension of D * F n q equals the size of the support of D.
We now turn to RGHW. Observe that although C 2
However, with a little care we can still say something.
The theorem now follows from Proposition 8.
where without loss of generality we assumeρ(
We next treat dual codes.
Definition 11. For c ∈ F n q \{ 0} define M( c) to be the smallest number i ∈ J such that c · b i = 0. Here a · b means the usual inner product between a and b.
It is clear that for an
The following result is proved by modifying the proof of [18, Prop. 3.12] and [17, Th. 5] slightly.
From the above discussion we derive Theorem 14. Consider linear codes C 2 C 1 . Let u be the largest element inρ(
To apply Theorem 9, Corollary 10 and Theorem 14 we need information on which pairs are OWB. This suggests the use of a supporting algebra. One class of algebras that works well is the order domains [19, 31, 16] . In the present paper we will concentrate on the most prominent example of order domain codes -namely one-point algebraic geometric codes.
Remark 15. In our exposition we used a single (but arbitrary) basis B for F n q as a vector space over F q . Following [33] one could reformulate all the above results in a more general setting that uses three bases U, V, and W. This point of view is important when one considers affine variety codes [34] , but it does not improve the results for order domain codes. In [12] and [13] , the concept of OWB was relaxed giving new improved Feng-Rao bounds. All the above results could be reformulated in this setting -but again -for order domain codes the results stay unchanged.
One-point algebraic geometric codes
Given an algebraic function field F of transcendence degree one, let P 1 , . . . , P n , Q be distinct rational places. For f ∈ F write ρ(f ) = −ν Q (f ) and denote by H(Q) the Weierstrass semigroup of Q. That is,
In the following let {f λ | λ ∈ H(Q)} be any fixed basis for R = ∪ ∞ µ=0 L(µQ) with ρ(f λ ) = λ for all λ ∈ H(Q). Let D = P 1 + · · · + P n and define
Here, the enumeration is chosen such that γ 1 < · · · < γ n . Consider the map ev : F → F n q given by ev(f ) = (f (P 1 ), . . . , f (P n )). The set
clearly is a basis for 
Pro. 28] we know that if δ ∈ H * (Q) and α, β ∈ H(Q) satisfy α + β = δ then we have α, β ∈ H * (Q). We therefore get the following lemma.
Lemma 16. Let { b 1 , . . . , b n } be as above. For i ∈ J it holds that
where Λ i is as in Definition 7.
Proposition 17. Let D ⊆ F n q be a vector space of dimension m. There exists unique numbers
Proof. By Lemma 16 the right side of (14) is lower than or equal to #∪ m s=1 Λ is , and (14) therefore follows from Proposition 8. Another way of writing the right side of (14) 
. This number is greater or equal than
From [19, Lem. 5 .15] we know that for any numerical semigroup Γ and λ ∈ Γ, one has λ = # Γ\(λ + Γ) . In particular # H(Q)\(γ im + H(Q)) = γ im and (15) follows.
From (15) we can obtain a manageable bound on the RGHWs of one-point algebraic geometric codes as we now explain. This bound even can be used when one does not know H * (Q). Given non-negative integers λ 1 < · · · < λ m (note that we make no assumptions that λ 1 , . . . , λ m ∈ H(Q)) let i j = λ j −λ m , j = 1, . . . , m − 1 and observe that 
We are now ready for the main result of the section.
Theorem 19. Let µ 1 , µ 2 be positive integers with µ 2 < µ 1 .
where
By the definition of the codes we have γ i 1 , . . . , γ im ∈ {µ 2 + 1, . . . , µ 1 } (this is the situation of Corollary 10). Consequently (18) and (19), respectively, follows from (14) and (15), respectively. We have −µ 1 ≤ −γ im . Similarly, by (16) Z(H(Q), µ, m) is smaller than or equal to the last term in (15) . These observations prove (20) .
Note that (20) can be strictly smaller than (19) . Firstly, µ 1 may not belong to H * (Q). Secondly, when applying the function Z(H(Q), µ, m) we do not discard those numbers in {µ 2 + 1, . . . , µ 1 − 1} that are gaps of H(Q), and even less those numbers in the interval that are not present in H * (Q). For duals of one-point algebraic geometric codes we have a bound similar to (18) , but no bounds similar to (19) or (20) .
Theorem 20. Let µ 1 , µ 2 and m be as in Theorem 19. We have
RGHWs of Hermitian codes
In this section we apply the results of the previous one to the case of Hermitian codes [37, 35] . Our main result is that (20) is often tight. The
Hermitian function field over F q 2 (q a prime power) is given by the equation x q+1 − y q − y and it possesses exactly q 3 + 1 rational places which we denote P 1 , . . . , P q 3 , Q -the last being the pole of x. The Weierstrass semigroup of Q, H(Q) = ρ(x) = q, ρ(y) = q + 1 , has g = q(q − 1)/2 gaps and conductor c = q(q − 1). Let D = P 1 + · · · + P q 3 . In the following by a Hermitian code we shall mean a code of the form C L (D, µQ) . Clearly, this code is of length n = q 3 . As is well-known the dual of a Hermitian code is a Hermitian code. This fact will be useful when in a later section we consider ramp schemes based on Hermitian codes. We start our investigation with a lemma that treats a slightly more general class of semigroups than the semigroup q, q + 1 relevant to us.
Lemma 21. Let a be an integer, a ≥ 2. Define Γ = a, a + 1 . For integers m, µ with 1 ≤ m ≤ µ ≤ a + 1 it holds that
Proof. Recall that a positive integer λ is called a gap of Γ if λ / ∈ Γ. All other non-negative integers are called non-gaps. For the given semigroup Γ the set of non-negative integers consists of one non-gap followed by a − 1 gaps, then two non-gaps followed by a − 2 gaps and so on up till a − 1 non-gaps followed by a − (a − 1) = 1 gap. All the following numbers are non-gaps. We denote the above maximal sequences of consecutive gaps (20) is the weakest. Using Lemma 21, for Hermitian codes of codimension at most q + 1, (20) translates into the below closed formula expression (23) . Surprisingly, this expression is often equal to the true value of the RGHW.
Theorem 22. Consider the Hermitian curve x
q+1 − y q − y over F q 2 . Let P 1 , . . . , P n=q 3 , and Q be the rational places and D = P 1 + · · · + P n . Let
Proof. Equation (23) 
• The number of common zeros of f 0 , . . . , f m−1 is exactly
The isomorphism is given by ϕ(x) = X +I and ϕ(y) = Y +I.
the Hermitian polynomial -N being the norm and Tr the trace corresponding to the field extension F q 2 /F q . In this description the rational places P 1 , . . . , P q 3 correspond to the affine points of the Hermitian polynomial. We remind the reader of the following couple of facts which play a crucial role in the below induction proofs:
• For any δ ∈ F q 2 we have N(δ), Tr(δ) ∈ F q .
• For every ǫ ∈ F q there exists exactly q different δ such that Tr(δ) = ǫ.
• There exist exactly q + 1 different δ such that N(δ) = 1.
We start by fixing some notation. Let {α 1 , . . . , α q } be the elements in F q 2 that map to 1 under Tr. Let {β 1 , . . . , β q 2 −(q+1) } be the elements that do not map to 1 under N and {γ 1 , . . . , γ q+1 } the elements that do. Write µ 1 = iq + j(q + 1) with 0 ≤ j < q. First assume 1 ≤ m ≤ j + 1 and that i < q 2 − q. By induction on m (in this interval) one can show that the set
has exactly iq + j(q + 1) − m−2 s=0 (q − s) common zeros with the Hermitian polynomial X q+1 − Y q − Y (we leave the technical details for the reader). Finally, assume j + 1 ≤ m ≤ j + q. By induction on m (in this interval) one can show that
has exactly iq + j(q + 1) − m s=0 (q − s) common zeros with the Hermitian polynomial X q+1 −Y q −Y (again we leave the technical details for the reader). For simplicity we covered the case m = j + 1 and i < q 2 − q in both induction proofs. Observe that the basis step m = j + 1 of the last induction proof corresponds to the terms in (28) , (29), (30) which are different from (25) , (26) , (27) with m = j + 1.
For 1 ≤ m ≤ µ 1 − µ 2 ≤ q + 1 but µ 1 and µ 2 not satisfying the condition in (24) we can often derive much better estimates than (23) . For µ 2 < c − 1 what may happen is that not all of the numbers µ 1 , µ 1 − 1, . . . , µ 1 − (m − 1) belong to H(Q), and thereby the worst case in the proof of Theorem 19 may not be realized. Hence, we should rather apply (19) or (18) (which are equivalent in this situation). For n−c ≤ µ 1 it may happen that H * (Q)\(µ 1 +H(Q)) is strictly smaller than H(Q)\(µ 1 +H(Q)) (this will happen if µ 1 = iq +j(q +1), with q 2 −q ≤ i < q 2 and 0 < j < q). In such case # H * (Q) ∩ (µ 1 + H(Q)) will be strictly larger than n − µ 1 . In addition not all of the numbers µ 1 , µ 1 − 1, . . . , µ 1 − (m − 1) need to belong to H * (Q) (this may happen if µ 1 ≥ n) and again the worst case considered in the proof of Theorem 19 may not be realizable. In this situation we should rather apply (18) .
We illustrate our observations with three examples. The first two are concerned with µ 2 < c − 1 and the last with n − c ≤ µ 1 . 8Q) ) is at least 52, 56 and 59, for m equal to 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Using (19) we shall show that for m = 2 and m = 3 the true values are at least 58 and 60, respectively. We first concentrate on m = 2. Using the notation from Proposition 17 we must investigate all γ i 1 , γ i 2 ∈ {9, 10, 12} with γ i 1 < γ i 2 , We have three different choices of (γ i 1 , γ i 2 ) to consider, namely (10, 12), (9, 12 ) and (9, 10). We first observe that Note that if α ∈ H(Q)\(λ + H(Q)) for λ ∈ {9, 10, 12} then also α ∈ H * (Q).
(γ i 1 , γ i 2 ) = (10, 12): We have
Hence, we get the value 52 + 6 = 58. producing the value 54 + 4 = 58.
The minimum of the above three values is 58 which then is our estimate
Finally consider m = 3. There is only one choice of (γ i 1 , γ i 2 , γ i 3 ) namely (9, 10, 12) . By inspection there are exactly 8 numbers that are in either 9 + H(Q) or 10 + H(Q) but not in 12 + H(Q). Hence, our estimate on 
is at least n − 10 = 54, n − 10 + 4 = 58 and n − 10 + 4 + 3 = 61, for m equal to 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The possible values of γ is to consider are 8, 9, 10, which constitute a sequence without gaps. Hence, according to our discussion prior to Example 1 we cannot improve upon Theorem 19 in this case. gives no information on the first two RGHWs and only tells us that the third relative weight is larger than or equal to 2. This, however, is actually neither an information as any space D of dimension 3 has a support of size at least 3.
As we will now demonstrate (18) guarantees that the three RGHWs are at least 3, 6, and 8, respectively. We first observe that
The smallest set is of size 3 and we get
The smallest union of two sets is the union of the first two. This union is of
The union of all three sets is of size 8.
A comparison between RGHW and GHW
In [29] and [3] , respectively, Munuera with Ramirez and Barbero with Munuera determined the GHWs of any Hermitian code. To state all their results would occupy plenty of space. However, already from their master theorem [29, Prop. 12] , [3, Prop. 2.3] , one can deduce that the RGHWs are often much larger than the corresponding GHWs.
The following is the master theorem from [29, 3] . Here, and throughout the rest of this section, we use the notation H(Q) = {ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . .} with ρ i < ρ j for i < j.
Equality holds under the following conditions:
, in which case we write n − µ + ρ m+α(µ) = iq + j(q + 1), where i, j are non-negative integers with j < q.
Observe that Theorem 25 and Theorem 22, respectively, produce similar estimates for the minimum distance and the relative minimum distance. A similar remark holds for the second GHW and the second RGHW. From the last part of Theorem 22 we conclude that for m = 1, 2 whenever m 
Proof. It is well-known [37] that for µ ≤ q 3 − 1 we have α(µ) = 0. Therefore (32) simplifies to d m (C L (D, µQ)) ≥ n − µ + ρ m under the conditions of the proposition. To prove the proposition it is enough to demonstrate the conditions 1, 2, and 3 of Theorem 25. As is well-known µ ∈ H * (Q) when c ≤ µ < n. But c < 2q 2 − q and condition 1 therefore follows. To see that condition 2 is satisfied note that by assumption c ≤ n − µ and therefore n − µ + ρ m+α(µ) ≥ c. To demonstrate condition 3 it is enough to show
Observe that ρ m ≤ q(q − 1) which holds because of the assumption that m ≤ q + 1 and q > 2 and because the number of gaps in H(Q) equals q(q − 1)/2. As a consequence the assumption 2q 2 − q ≤ µ implies q 2 + ρ m ≤ µ from which we derive (33) .
Proposition 27. Consider the field F q 2 , with q > 2. Let 3 ≤ µ ≤ q + 1 be fixed. For m = 3, . . . , µ there are at least
Proof. Follows from Theorem 25, Theorem 22 and a study of H(Q).
Note that if for fixed µ we divide the number of different codes C L (D, µQ) for which (34) holds by the number of different codes, which is q 3 , then we get the ratio R(q) ≥ (q 3 − 3q 2 + 1)/q 3 ≥ 1 − 3/q. This ratio approaches 1 as q goes to infinity. For q = 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 16, and 32, respectively, R(q) is at least 0.25, 0.4, 0.57, 0.62, 0.66, 0.81, and 0.9, respectively. In Table 1 we list for different values of m and q the difference between the parameters as expressed in (34).
Ramp schemes based on Hermitian codes
In this section we consider ramp secret sharing schemes Table 1 : Diff(m, q) is the value of (34).
− µ)Q).
To establish information on r m we therefore do not need to apply Theorem 20 (the theorem for duals of one-point algebraic geometric codes), but can instead use the already established information on the RGHW of C 2 ⊆ C 1 . From Theorem 22 we get the following result:
Theorem 28. Let µ, µ be positive integers satisfying
Consider the ramp secret sharing scheme
The codimension (and thereby the length of the secret) equals µ. Furthermore for m = 1, . . . , µ it holds that
Equality holds simultaneously in (36) and (37) when the second condition in (35) is replaced with
Example 4. In this example we consider schemes over F 64 . That is, q = 8 and the number of participants is n = 512. The assumption (35) for (36) and (37) to hold is µ ≤ 9, 55 + µ ≤ µ ≤ 511, the latter corresponding to (q − s) (which is our upper bound on r m − (n − µ)). Note that G 1 (m, q) = Z(H(Q), µ, m) (Lemma 21). For the considered choice of µ the secret is of size equal to 9 q 2 -bits. One can read much information from Table 2 . Assume for instance n − µ = 130. Then the smallest group that can derive some information is of size 130 + 0 = 130, hence t 1 = 129. The smallest group size for which any group can derive some information is r 1 = 130+28 = 158. Groups of size 158 on the other hand can never obtain more than 5 q 2 -bits of information as G 1 (5, 8) ≤ 158 − 130 < G 1 (6, 8) . Some group of size t 3 + 1 = 130 + 15 = 145 can derive at least 3 q 2 -bits of information but the smallest group size for which one can be sure to be able to reveal 3 q 2 -bits of information is r 3 = 130 + 31 = 161. Any group of size r 9 = 130 + 64 = 194 can reveal the entire secret. Some group of size t 9 + 1 = 130 + 36 = 166 can reveal the entire secret whereas other groups of size 166 can reveal no more than 4 q 2 -bits of information.
Example 5. In this example we consider schemes over F 256 . That is, q = 16 and the number of participants is n = 4096. Assumption (35) is 1 ≤ n − µ < 3857 − µ and by (38) equality holds in (36) and (37) simultaneously if
In Table 3 we list values of G 1 (m, 16) and G 2 (m, 16, 16) where the functions G 1 and G 2 are as in Example 4. Assuming (39) then from the table we read the following information: Some groups of size t 1 + 1 = n − µ may reveal 1 q 2 -bit of information whereas other groups of size n − µ + 119 can not as r 1 = n−µ+120. Some group of size t 11 +1 = n−µ+115 can reveal 11 q 2 -bits of information whereas some group of the same size can not reveal anything. Any group of size n − µ + 135 can for sure reveal 5 q 2 -bits of information and some group of the same size can reveal everything. Any group of size r 16 = n − µ + 255 can reveal the entire secret.
Remark 29. Assume that (35) holds and let m ≤ µ. The difference between the smallest size for which any group can reveal m q 2 -bits of information and the smallest size for which some group can reveal m q 2 -bits of information equals (n − M µ+1−m (C 
(with equality if 2c − 2 + µ < µ < n − c). The maximum of (40) is attained at m = 1 and m = µ. The corresponding "worst-case" difference equals c + µ − 1 − µ−1 2 (2q − µ + 2). This number is highest possible when µ = q and µ = q + 1, in which case it equals the genus g = (q 2 − q)/2.
We conclude the section with an example in which we show how to improve upon (36) and (37) when the condition (38) is not satisfied.
Example 6. In this example we consider schemes over F 16 . That is, q = 4 and the number of participants is n = 64. We consider secrets of length 3. Hence, we require that and therefore without loss of generality the possible choices of (µ 1 , µ 2 ) are
1 , µ
2 ), . . . , (µ
2 )} = {(5, −1), (8, 0), (9, 4) , (10, 5) , (12, 8) , (13, 9) , (14, 10) , (15, 12) , Recall from the discussion prior to Example 1 in Section 6 that for some choices of (µ 1 , µ 2 ) we may achieve better estimates on the RGHW than (23) . This is done by applying the method of Example 1 and Example 3 which corresponds to (19) and (18), respectively. Concretely for µ 1 = 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 we do not have
and to calculate t m we therefore apply the method of Example 1. By inspection, for µ 1 = 53, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 75 we have that H * (Q)\(µ 1 + H(Q)) is strictly smaller than H(Q)\(µ 1 + H(Q)) and in addition for some of these values, (41) does not hold either. Hence, we apply the method of Example 3. In conclusion the values of µ 1 for which we can potentially obtain improved information on t m are S 1 = {µ We next discuss r m . Here, a little care is needed in the analysis: as an example for (µ 1 , µ 2 ) = (µ Applying a mixture of the method from Example 1 and Example 3 plus (23) we derive for µ 1 ∈ S 1 ∪ S 2 the information given in we have µ 2 = µ 1 − 3, and the best bounds (sometimes tight) are obtained from (23) . They are: [t 1 ≥ n − µ 1 − 1, r 1 ≤ n − µ 1 + 7], [t 2 ≥ n − µ 1 + 3, r 2 ≤ n − µ 1 + 10] and [t 3 ≥ n − µ 1 + 6, r 3 ≤ n − µ 1 + 14].
